Monday, June 03, 2019
Strong state, strong society: The reforms India needs Prime Minister Narendra Modi to courageously undertake
The Times of India | May 31, 2019
With the re-election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, fears are again being expressed of creeping authoritarianism in India. But i worry about the opposite problem. I do not fear a strong state but a weak and ineffective one. A weak state has frail institutions, especially a feeble rule of law that takes a dozen years to give justice and has 3.3 crore cases pending in the courts. A weak state does not protect the weak against the strong. A weak state creates uncertainty rather than predictability in peoples' minds and allows policemen, ministers and judges to be bought. It also prevents quick action by the executive and slows reforms to a snail's pace because of warped incentives within the bureaucracy.
One lesson that Modi should have learnt in the past five years is about the limits of the Indian prime minister's power. A liberal democratic state rests on three pillars: an effective executive, the rule of law and accountability. We obsess over the third pillar when the real issue is the first. With the nation always in election mode, India's problem is not accountability, it is about the ability of the state to get things done.
The Indian prime minister is weak also because real power resides with state chief ministers, who are the real rulers of India. Ironically, it was Modi's performance as chief minister that got him elected in 2014, and we assumed that he would carry that magic when he became prime minister. It didn't happen. Although Indira Gandhi came close to becoming a dictator, she too discovered the limits of her power.
In 2014, Modi asked the Indian people to give him 10 years to transform India. Well, here is his chance. That transformation must begin not with economic reform but with reform of governance. Modi can take inspiration from Margaret Thatcher, who saved up the more difficult reforms – the reforms of the state – for her second term. It will not be easy to enhance state capacity because India has historically been a weak state unlike China. Our history is that of independent kingdoms while China's is a history of unitary empires. The four empires of India – Maurya, Gupta, Mughal and British – were weaker than the weakest Chinese empire.
Our first loyalty is to society – our family, our jati, our village. Although the state was mostly weak, India always had a strong society. Hence, oppression did not come from the state but from society – from the Brahmins, for example, and it needed a constant stream of renouncers and saints, like the Buddha, to protect us from oppression. Because power was dispersed historically, India could only have become a federal democracy 70 years ago and China could only have become an authoritarian state. The lesson from history is that we need a strong state to get things done and we need a strong society to make the state accountable.
China's government today is ironically more popular than India's because it has delivered outstanding performance. Not only has it wiped out poverty, making a poor country middle class, but it has relentlessly improved day to day governance. In the end, China has delivered better education, health and welfare to aam admi. The secret of its success is not authoritarianism but the fact that it has focussed on state capacity. While elections have given the Indian people more freedom (and this is a great achievement) the Chinese state has given its people a more predictable day to day life through better governance. This is not to suggest that Indians will exchange their system for the Chinese (nor should they) but if you try and put yourself in the shoes of the Indian and the Chinese aam admi, you must feel disappointed with our democracy.
China has succeeded in enhancing the capacity of its state by making its bureaucracy more motivated and effective. This means closely monitoring and rewarding the performance of officials. Promotions in the Chinese bureaucracy are not based on seniority but upon superior delivery of services to citizens. These incentives in turn motivate Chinese bureaucrats to be more pragmatic – unlike rule bound Indian officials – and they search for and re-apply the best practices that deliver on the ground.
India's bureaucracy has suffered for decades because no political leader has had the guts to implement the crying reforms that everyone has agreed upon for 50 years. An honest and transparent tax collecting machinery will collect more taxes in the end. The same thing applies to reforms in the three other parts of the state – the judiciary, the police and the Parliament – where countless reform commissions have endorsed the same blueprints for change.
Will Modi be the strong leader who has the courage to take on vested interests and enhance the capacity of the Indian state? He certainly has plenty of experience, both in Gujarat and in the Centre, and he also knows the pitfalls in taking on vested interests. The way to begin is to catch low hanging fruit. This means to first implement existing laws; then only create new laws. When it comes to policy, it is not about the 'what' but about the 'how'. Everyone knows what is to be done; the real question is, how to do it. India has plenty of laws but China has order. You need both 'law and order', as the American TV serial says.
Reforming institutions will be much tougher than economic reform but the rewards will also be greater. If he succeeds, Modi will go down in history as the one who fulfilled his promise of 'minimum government, maximum governance'. India has done well when it has bet on its people; it is about time to bet on its government.
Tuesday, April 16, 2019
Foreign Affairs | April 11, 2019
Why I Fell Out of Love With India's Reformist Prime Minister
India in 2014 was a troubled and discontented nation. Inflation was in the double digits, growth was declining, and corruption was rampant. Sick of the drift and paralysis in the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, many Indians longed for a leader who would get the nation out of the mess. The situation was not unlike Britain's in the late 1970s. Britain found Margaret Thatcher; India found Narendra Modi.
The sudden ascent of the tough and stocky 63-year-old as a serious contender for the nation's highest office caught everyone by surprise. As chief minister of the state of Gujarat, Modi had built a vibrant economy and reduced corruption. His campaign speeches, with their single-minded focus on vikas (development) were fresh and mesmerizing. But people were also wary. Modi was considered dictatorial and anti-Muslim. Above all, he carried the stain of Hindu-Muslim riots in 2002, when his state government looked the other way as nearly a thousand people, most of them Muslims, were killed over several days.
I, too, worried about electing a politician like Modi. Yet I also believed that the Indian government was not doing enough to capitalize on its extremely young population, about half of which is under the age of 25. If those millions of working-age women and men could be lifted from underemployment in the informal sector to well-paying jobs, the gains in overall prosperity would far outweigh the burden of supporting the old and the very young. Economists call this the "demographic dividend," which is known to spur GDP growth in developing countries. If managed well, India's economy had the potential to lift millions from poverty and send the country on a path to middle-income status. But within a dozen years, the window of opportunity would close as India's youth began to age. Among the candidates in the 2014 elections, Modi seemed to be the only one to grasp this, making him the country's best hope for reaping the demographic dividend. The alternative was Rahul Gandhi—a scion of the political dynasty that had governed the country for the better part of six decades—and he did not even come close.
I contemplated a dilemma. Should India risk its precious commitment to secularism and pluralism for the sake of prosperity, jobs, and fighting corruption? I agonized for months and then did something unusual. I decided, for the first time in my life, to vote for the right-wing, Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)—and I did so because Modi was its leader. I was among the first Indian liberals to endorse him publicly, in my Sunday column in the Times of India and in six other Indian papers.
There was no denying that Modi was a sectarian and authoritarian figure. But I knew that India's democratic institutions were strong enough to prevail over those tendencies. Nothing would absolve Modi of his responsibility for the 2002 riots. But neither would anything lessen the moral imperative to fight widespread poverty with sound economic policy. A vote for the BJP was, in my mind, a calculated risk. Millions of Indians agreed, and Modi swept the polls.
To voters used to being treated like victims, Modi's uplifting image and rhetoric were a welcome change. The Indian National Congress of Rahul Gandhi cast its constituents as defenseless casualties of global capitalism; a slate of caste-based parties promised justice for those harmed by India's rigid social hierarchies. But Modi—the son of a chaiwallah, one of India's ubiquitous tea-sellers—embodied the promise of social mobility across the boundaries of caste and class. That his English was labored at best only burnished his credentials as a man of the people. His landslide victory credited the dignity of shopkeepers and invited India's Anglophile elite to re-examine its Brahmanical prejudices.
Modi extended the BJP's appeal to India's rapidly growing middle class, which had enjoyed the fruits of economic liberalization in the 1990s. But in so doing, he created a divided party, with an economically liberal wing and a culturally conservative wing. Many in the former did not subscribe to the BJP's cultural agenda of Hindutva, the belief that India should be a nation of and for the Hindus. Even if these voters had supported Modi's agenda of economic reform, his party's majoritarian politics left a feeling of discomfort that was hard to shake.
Five years on, I am disillusioned. Modi has delivered only partially on his economic promises, and he has unconscionably polarized the country. With a GDP growth rate of roughly seven percent, India's is the fastest-growing major economy, but this growth has not brought the promised jobs. Nor has Modi leveraged his outright majority in the lower house of parliament (rare in Indian politics) to execute the far-reaching reforms that would have made India more competitive. He could, for example, have reformed the distribution of farm commodities and thus helped prevent the recent collapse in food prices, which has destroyed countless farmers' livelihoods. He could have used India's slow-burning banking crisis to privatize the worst-performing public-sector banks, which are going the way of Air India, the state airline that has been mismanaged into near bankruptcy. No other democracy has 70 percent of its financial assets locked in public-sector banks, where the temptation is high to issue loans based on political ties. Modi could also have focused more on exports. Instead, he has been gradualist like his predecessors, broadly operating within the old consensus of excessive public ownership and state control.
To be sure, Modi has delivered on two major promises: inflation has come down from double digits to between two and three percent. Corruption has not vanished, but it has declined, with the country moving up seven spots in Transparency International's Corruptions Perceptions Index since 2014. Several of Modi's reforms have been game-changers. Although poorly implemented, the landmark Goods and Services Tax has replaced a messy patchwork of state-level taxes, finally turning all of India into a single market. By some estimates, its introduction may increase annual GDP growth by as much as 2 percent in the long term. A new bankruptcy code will ensure that the country's assets are more productively employed, as dying companies can now be taken over by new owners. Because 300 million Indians now have bank accounts, and more than a billion have cell phones and unique biometric identity cards, mobile banking has taken off. The government can therefore gradually switch from leaky subsidies to direct cash transfers. Similarly, transactions between citizens and the state are moving online, leading India to move up over 50 spots in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index since 2014. Modi has begun the job of making India function better.
Modi has broadly operated within the old consensus of excessive public ownership and state control.
Other moves were smaller but important nonetheless. India began auctioning natural resources online in a transparent manner, liberalized rules for foreign investment, deregulated energy prices, and allowed the self-attestation of legal documents (which freed citizens from running around to get their documents attested by government officials or corrupt notaries). Much-needed legislation for labour reform and land acquisition got stuck, however, because the BJP did not have a majority in the upper house.
And Modi's boldest move turned out to be a blunder. On November 8, 2016, he proclaimed that 500-rupee and 1,000-rupee notes would no longer be legal tender—a sudden announcement that rendered worthless almost 87 percent of the currency in circulation. The measure, an attempt to rein in corruption and the informal economy, touched the life of every Indian with crushing effect. For months, people stood in line outside banks to change their notes. The liquidity crisis destroyed the livelihoods of millions of people. Two years later, most economists believe that demonetization is one of the worst ways to tackle corruption and the untaxed economy. Reducing institutional opportunities for bribery and embezzlement is far more productive.
Some of the most robust government institutions have weakened: official data on jobs, for example, can no longer be trusted. Meanwhile, fears about Modi's majoritarian politics have come partially true. Although bloody riots like those in Gujarat in 2002 have not recurred, diverse India's prized social cohesion is under threat, and religious minorities feel insecure. The BJP's obsession with Hindu nationalism has legitimated bans on beef production in the populous Hindi-speaking northern states and emboldened vigilantes who attack anyone suspected of mistreating cows.
At the heart of Modi's failure is the weak capacity of the Indian state. Modi relied excessively on the civil service to formulate complex reforms, rather than bringing in outside experts. Civil servants are often inclined to protect the status quo instead of executing new initiatives—especially in a country where seniority, not results, still gets people promoted.
Consider Modi's Make in India program, a push to make the country more competitive in global markets. Indian civil servants lacked the competence to oversee such an effort. Moreover, since Jawaharlal Nehru was prime minister in the 1950s, Indian civil servants have looked upon exports with skepticism. Yet if India could grow its abysmal 1.7 percent share of global trade to 2.5 percent, the jobs now leaving China could come to India, rather than to Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia.
Moreover, Modi announced too many programs at once and tried to execute them all himself. He centralized decision-making in the prime minister's office—something he had done successfully as chief minister of Gujarat. But India, with its federal structure, is not Gujarat. A chief minister may be all-powerful in a given state, but a prime minister has to learn to implement programs by motivating and cajoling regional leaders across the country. To make matters worse, Modi seems to have been continuously in an election mode for the past five years. Constant campaigning diverts the executive's attention from executing reforms that often bring short-term pain for long-term gain. To be fair, Modi was aware of this problem— he championed introducing simultaneous state elections across the country, but the idea lacked support among other parties.
Modi is ultimately not a liberal reformer. He is a pragmatic modernizer, like Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew. His stance owes in part to external constraints: to this day, capitalism has not found a comfortable home in India. Many citizens believe that market-oriented reforms make the rich richer and the poor poorer. Despite the huge benefits of increased competition since 1991, many Indians cannot distinguish between being pro-market and pro-business. India has not had a leader like China's Deng Xiaoping or the United Kingdom's Margaret Thatcher, capable of selling the competitive market to the people. As a result, every Indian government has reformed by stealth, and Modi has been no different.
THE UNHAPPY CENTER
Over the next five weeks, 900 million voters will be eligible to vote and election fever will once again seize the country. Probably because Modi has failed to create jobs, the BJP's rhetoric has turned from economics to identity politics and security issues. When a Pakistan-based terrorist group killed some 40 Indian paramilitary troops in Kashmir on February 14, the government took the unprecedented step of retaliating with an air strike inside Pakistan, purportedly against a terrorist camp. The incident, and the subsequent battle of Indian and Pakistani jet fighter planes, burnished Modi's military credentials. The whole episode fits in well with his nationalist rhetoric, which brands as unpatriotic anyone who criticizes the government, especially on its military counterterrorism operations in Kashmir.
My own dreams for Modi have faded. Had he reformed vigorously and begun to deliver the promised jobs, I would have applauded him for giving India a shot at the demographic dividend. I might even have forgiven his distasteful ethno-nationalist politics. But Modi remains the most popular leader on the Indian political scene. It seems unlikely that the Congress Party under Rahul Gandhi, with its chaotic coalition of regional allies, will unite behind a positive vision and create an effective vehicle for reform. Instead, the country is polarized between those who love Modi and those who hate him. A middle-of-the-road person such as myself finds that he has no one to vote for. Many Indians are here with me, in the unhappy center.
Friday, January 04, 2019
the Globalist | December 25, 2018
"Our existence is but a brief crack of light between two eternities of darkness," wrote Vladimir Nabokov in the opening lines of his memoir, Speak Memory.
Nabokov believed that human beings are more afraid of the abyss after death and viewed the one before birth more calmly.
Whereas the fearful unknown of the dark voids drove my Hindu father to mystical religion, I was drawn to the bright side. There I found kama or "desire" in Sanskrit.
Unlike animals, human beings are not governed by instinct alone. Instinctual desire travels from our senses to our imagination, from where it creates a fantasy around a specific individual.
These fantasies become the source of intense "pleasure," and this happens to be the other meaning of kama. Ever fearful of too much devotion to erotic love, most societies are worried about this charming human inclination, and instituted monogamy via the institution of marriage.
This was done for the sake of social harmony. Fancying a neighbour's wife or husband can be an intoxicating temptation. Reaching for it can bring pain and tragedy, destroying families and peace.
Kama can be a desire for anything, but like the English word "desire," it refers generally to erotic desire.
A desire to act
Kama is also the desire to act. It drove Shakespeare to sit down one morning and write dazzling Othello, who turned out, alas, to be one of the unhappiest victims of kama.
Since my ancient Hindu ancestors realized that kama is the source of action, of creation and of procreation, they elevated it not only to a god, but also one of the goals of the human life. They thought of it as a cosmic force that animates all of life.
Kama's history is the struggle between kama optimists and pessimists. While kama optimists zero in on strategies from the Kamasutra for entering the "web of desire," as William Blake called it, kama pessimists are concerned about kama's darker, sinister side.
They dwell on how it creates, but also destroys. That it may inspire love alright, but this drive can become uncontrollable, obsessive and violent.
One can spend a lifetime to discover how to enjoy desire but not too much how to strike a civilized balance between over-indulgence and repression.
Wanting what you don't have
Plato wisely observed that desire is a lack of something that one does not possess. Lovers long to unite in order to fill this deficiency. But how can something that is missing, or perishes once attained, be a goal of life.
Kamagita, a "song of desire," embedded deep inside the Mahabharata, the ancient Indian epic, reminds us that when we control one desire, another pops up.
For example, in those who choose to give up desire for wealth and give away their money, a new craving emerges — a desire for reputation. Conversely, those who choose to renounce the world and become an ascetic are often driven by a desire for heaven or for moksha, "liberation" from the human condition.
More than 2,500 years ago in the forests of north India, some curious fellows, while conducting mental experiments, called the Upanishads were struck by the unsatisfactory nature of kama.
To them, finding an answer was very important, and it was also central to the Buddha's project. The ancient yogis sought ways to quiet this endless, futile striving, and their goal became chitta vriti nirodha, "to still the fluctuations in the mind," in the words of Patanjali.
Acting without desire
The answer of the Bhagavad Gita to this riddle of kama is to learn to act without desire. But how is this possible when, according to the earliest Upanishad, "man is desire"?
You are what your deep, driving desire is. As you desire is, so is your will As your will is, so is your deed. As your deed is, so is your destiny.
The Bhagavad Gita is aware that a person cannot stop desiring, nor does it want him to lose the will to act. It proposed the idea of "desireless action," which means to renounce the personal rewards of one's own actions – in short, act so that you don't care who gets the credit.
I have read this refrain dozens of times, but I remain sceptical that a person can give up his fundamental, egoistic desire and still remain human.
A lurking pessimism
In India, we tend to blame the Victorians for the prudishness of the Indian middle class. But we must acknowledge that, lurking deep in the Indian psyche, is deep pessimism about kama's prospects.
This is what led the great ascetic god, Shiva, to burn the god of love in frustration when the latter disturbed his thousand-year meditation. Hence, desire exists ananga, "bodiless," in the human mind.
During my Christian missionary school education here in India, I was taught to equate desire with "original sin." But the ganja smoking priest from our neighbourhood temple told me stories of playful, mischievous gods, who created the world for the fun of it.
And one of them, Krishna, danced with 40,000 women for an entire Brahma night that lasted 4.5 billion human years. From him I learned that our civilization is the only one that elevated kama to an aim of life and left behind a legacy of erotic Sanskrit love poetry, the Kamasutra and the erotic sculptures at Khajuraho.
Even the devotional love of god took a romantic turn in Gitagovinda, where Radha, a married woman, longs to unite with her divine, adulterous lover.
I am at an age when I mostly relive memories, some intimate, others wistful, and still others so distressing that I am left in a sweat.
Desiring to desire
Much like the next person, I desire to desire. The human rhythm is that we live for a while and then we die. It matters to us in ways that it does not to other creatures.
What is this mattering? We want our lives to have meaning. Well, kama too is a gesture in the direction of a meaningful life.
If nothing else, it is a compensatory move. After all, we are constantly reminded about dharma, "our duty to others." Repressed as we are, the thought escapes us that kama is also a duty—a "duty to ourselves."
Ultimately, kama is needed to realize our capacity for living a flourishing life.
Sunday, December 30, 2018
Thursday, September 13, 2018
Gays and colonial brainwashing: Learn from India’s open, exuberant past and respect those who differ from us
Times of India | September 12, 2018 - 19:41
My son is gay and i no longer feel reluctant to admit it. He has been in a loyal, happy relationship with his partner for 20 years and my family and close friends have accepted it gracefully. I didn't dare speak about it in public, however, for fear of bringing him any harm – that is until 12.35pm on Thursday when the Supreme Court (SC) decriminalised homosexuality. My wife and i suddenly feel as if a great burden has lifted. The chief justice's wise words continue to ring in my ears, "I am what I am. So, take me as I am."
For 157 years, Indians have lived under a tyrannical colonial law that was contrary to our country's ancient spirit. Meanwhile, the English realised their mistake – that "sexual orientation is natural and people have no control over it" (as the court's judgment said) – and they discarded the law in Britain long ago. Tragically, the colonial brainwashing went so deep that this un-Indian imposition remained on India's statute books for 71 years after the colonisers left.
I was too young in August 1947 to understand what it meant to be politically free but i was certainly old enough to celebrate our economic independence in July 1991. And on September 6, 2018, i was not too old to applaud our ‘emotional independence’. India is a country in transition from tradition to modernity and it is just as important to speak and act freely about our emotional life as our economic and political lives. For too long we have repressed emotions and lived with patriarchal stereotypes. Secrecy is unhealthy for a wholesome society.
Although the judges quoted great Western writers in support of their historic judgment, they could also have cited classical Indian texts, which show remarkable tolerance for gender ambiguity. The epics are full of stories about men turning into women and vice versa, and they are told matter of factly without guilt or shame. There are plenty of examples in Vanita and Kidwai’s book, Same-Sex Love in India: Readings from Literature and History.
India’s is the only civilisation to have elevated kama or desire and pleasure to a goal of life. Along with the three other aims – artha, ‘material well-being’, dharma, ‘moral well-being’, and moksha, ‘spiritual well-being’, we are expected to cherish kama’s ‘emotional well-being’. We are constantly reminded about dharma, our duty to others but the thought escapes us that kama is a duty to ourselves. The extreme pleasure of sex is, perhaps, recompense for the loneliness of the human condition.
In the Christian tradition, in the beginning was light (in Genesis). In the Rig Veda, in the beginning was kama and the cosmos was created from the seed of desire in the mind of the One. Desire was the first act of consciousness and ancient Indians called it shakti, the source of the sexual drive and the life instinct. In contrast, desire was associated with ‘original sin’, guilt and shame in Christianity.
We blame the Victorians for the prudishness of today’s Indian middle class but lurking deep in the Indian psyche is also pessimism about kama. More than 2,500 years ago in the forests of north India, ancient yogis, renouncers and the Buddha were struck by the unsatisfactory nature of kama. The yogis sought ways to quiet this endless, futile striving. Patanjali taught us chitta vriti nirodha to still the fluctuations of the mind. The ascetic god, Shiva, burnt the god Kama when the latter disturbed his thousand-year meditation; hence, desire exists ananga, ‘bodiless’ in the mind. Bhagavad Gita’s answer is to learn to act without desire but it is difficult to achieve it when ‘man is desire’ according to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.
Opposed to the pessimists were optimists, who thought of kama as a ‘life force’, a cosmic energy that animated the cell and held it in place. Since kama is the source of action, creation and procreation, their optimism culminated in the first millennium in Sanskrit love poetry and an erotic text of manners, the Kamasutra, which is not a sex manual but a charming, surprisingly modern guide to the art of living. In the clash between the optimists and pessimists emerged kama realists, who offered a grand compromise in the dharma texts, stating that sex is fine as long as it is within marriage.
Into this pre-modern world entered the British with a pessimistic overhang of what George Bernard Shaw contemptuously called ‘Victorian middle class morality’, and they enacted laws such as Section 377. Fortunately, a more optimistic age began in India in the 1990s when the minds of the urban young began to get decolonised, reaching a peak in 2009 with the landmark judgment of Justice AP Shah of the Delhi high court on same sex relationships.
There was a regression for a while after 2013 when the higher court reversed course, but after Thursday’s SC judgment, a new era of kama optimism has begun. It will take time for a court ruling to overcome prejudice in society, especially at a time when right-wing vigilantes appear to lose their rational faculties over ‘love jihad’, Valentine’s Day (which should be renamed ‘Kamadeva Divas’, as Shashi Tharoor has suggested) and ‘Romeo squads’ run amuck.
The SC judgment implies that to be civilised is to say: I prefer the opposite sex but I do not object to you preferring the same sex. In a free, civilised country we must learn to respect those who differ from us. The state should stay out of the bedroom and let us learn from our open, exuberant ancient traditions, where the secret to a rich, flourishing life lies in the harmonious equilibrium between the four goals of life.
Tuesday, May 29, 2018
In the uproar surrounding last week’s acquisition of Flipkart by Walmart, the true significance of the world’s largest e-commerce deal escaped everyone. Headlines screamed about the coming battle in India between two American giants, Amazon and Walmart. News channels narrated a Cinderella story of two youngsters who started selling a few books from their two bedroom flat in Bengaluru and created a company that was worth $21 billion ten years later, making a hundred of its employees dollar millionaires.
Nationalists moaned about the takeover of an Indian by a foreign company. Economists saw it as a coming of age of India: following China’s example, India too would now join up with one of the most powerful global supply chains, giving a major impetus to our exports, accelerating foreign investment and jobs in the country.
India’s young start-up community was excited that the deal was a role model of how an Indian entrepreneur could be handsomely rewarded for the hard work in building a company. And our tax department was salivating over the bonanza in capital gains from the deal.
All this is true but none of it captures the full story. Yes, May 10, 2018 was a historic milestone in India’s economic history when Walmart, the world’s largest retailer announced a $16 billion acquisition for a 77% stake in Flipkart, India’s largest online marketplace. It was a lot of money to pay for a company that was losing money and not expected to break even in the next five years; some had even predicted the demise of Flipkart. When the deal was announced, the price of Walmart shares fell in its home country and investors lost $10 billion.
What most observers failed to grasp are the true benefits to India, which emanate from Walmart’s competitive advantage over Amazon. It is able to deliver fresh, high quality vegetables, fruits and other farm produce via a legendary cold chain which it has perfected in 28 countries. Neither Amazon, nor Flipkart has this.
Reliance also tried to do a Walmart in India in its foray into ‘Reliance Fresh’ but it failed. It is also good news for kirana stores. Walmart has been operating a chain of 21 Best Price wholesale stores, supplying to over a million retailers in India. It now plans to convert many of them into ‘partners’ for its last mile delivery to the Indian home.
It will upgrade the kirana store’s skills in inventory management, digital payments, and logistics technology. Thus, it has neutralised the earlier hostility from the trade. The real story in the emerging e-commerce battle is the potential transformation of India’s agriculture and kirana store.
A respected management consultancy firm has estimated that the Walmart-Flipkart venture will require infusion of significantly more capital – Walmart has already announced $5 billion – and this could create roughly a crore new jobs over time. It has already made a strong start by sourcing 97% of its goods from Indian medium and small enterprises, exporting $4-5 billion each year.
This trend will accelerate. In line with its global practice, the new Walmart operation will source 95% of its goods locally. Plus, the jobs it will create in logistics, cold chain, warehousing, distribution and delivery, add up to 10 million jobs.
I sometimes wonder why i pay Rs 20 per kilo for potatoes when the farmer receives only Rs 5. My potatoes travel some distance, i realise, from the farm to the mandi to my kirana shop, and each person in the chain takes his cut. Still, the Rs 15 gap seems excessive. Analysis shows that in countries where large supermarkets operate, the gap is smaller because farmers have long term contracts with large retailers and they invariably receive higher returns because of eliminating middlemen.
Yes, it is arthiyas and wholesalers in the mandi who will lose. But i refuse to shed tears for them since they operate a corrupt cartel which exploits the farmer. A typical farmer harvests his crop, loads it on a bullock cart, travels 30 km to the mandi, where he is often forced to sell at distress prices fixed by the cartel. The arthiya knows that the crop is perishable.
Aware of this corrupt system, the central government has created a model reform act, scrapping the ‘agricultural produce marketing committees’ (APMC). But only a few states (like Maharashtra and Bihar) have implemented it. The reason is that the corrupt APMCs provide black money to politicians to fight elections. The e-NAM portal was supposed to provide online information to farmers in surrounding mandis, but like most government programmes it has been a flop.
In contrast, global retailers like Walmart invest in cold storages, airconditioned trucks and grading facilities, and connect the farmer to food processors; this saves post-harvest losses and increases farmer income. Given the pervasive APMC cartels, the benefits of Walmart’s entry will thus only be confined to a handful of states. This is a great pity since a third to half of India’s food crop rots.
If he is serious about doubling farmer incomes, Prime Minister Narendra Modi faces a choice. Will he pick up the phone and tell chief ministers of BJP ruled states to abolish APMCs, or will he accept the corrupt cartels that finance his, and other parties? If he is true to his election promises to end corruption and double farm incomes, he will free farmers to sell their produce to anyone they choose, freeing them from the clutches of the ‘APMC Raj’. Only in this way will India take the full advantage of the coming battle of the giants.
Tuesday, February 27, 2018
संदर्भ... देश के हर वर्ग में बढ़ता रोष व असंतोष और रोजगार बढ़ाने पर पूरा ध्या न केंद्रित करने की जरूरत
प्रत्येक नए वर्ष पर मेरे पड़ोसी महोदय बहुत प्रयत्नपूर्वक संकल्प लेते हैं और उतनी ही फुर्ती से जनवरी खत्म होने के पहले उन्हें तोड़ भी डालते हैं। हम आमतौर पर साल के पहले हफ्ते में मिलकर एक-दूसरे को अपने संकल्प बताते हैं लेकिन, मैं जनवरी मेंम्यांमार व दक्षिण-पूर्वी एशिया में था तो हम पिछले हफ्ते ही मिल पाए, जब मेरी पत्नी ने उन्हें एक मग मसाला चाय के लिए आमंत्रित किया । 'तो बताएं इस साल आपका इरादा कौन-से संकल्प तोड़ने का है?' मेरे पड़ोसी ने कबूल किया कि उनका एक संकल्प तो राजनीति और धर्म पर कम गुस्सा करने का है।
पंकज मिश्रा की गहरी दृष्टि देने वाली किताब 'एज ऑफ एंगर' के मुताबिक हम क्रोध के युग में जी रहे हैं। राष्ट्रवादी राजनीतिक आंदोलनों के फिर उदय ने भारत सहित पूरी दुनिया का ध्रुवीकरण किया है। हम हमेशा मौजूद हिंसा से गुजर रहे हैं, जिसे अल्पसंख्यकों के प्रति नफरत और राष्ट्रवाद के विषैले रूपों से ईंधन मिल रहा है। दक्षिणपंथी अतिवादियों की हिंसा के बराबर ही उदारवादियों का अहंकार है, जो सहिष्णुता के नाम पर उन लोगों के साथ ठीक वैसा ही असहिष्णु व्यवहार करते हैं, जिनकी आस्थाएं उनसे अलग हैं। खामियां दोनों तरफ हैं और 2018 के लिए मोदी के श्रेष्ठतम संकल्पों में से एक यह होना चाहिए कि इस विभाजन को भरें, सोशल मीडिया में अधिक सभ्य बहस लाएं और हमारी ज़िंदगियों को अधिक शांत बनाएं। भारत आज उपद्रवग्रस्त और असंतुष्ट राष्ट्र है। बुद्धिजीवी वर्ग मोदी पर गुस्सा है कि वे देश का ध्रुवीकरण करने का प्रयास कर रहे हैं। वमपंथ अब तक 2014 में उनकी विजय को पचा नहीं पाया है और यह देख स्तब्ध है कि उनकी लोकप्रियता बरकरार है और 2019 के लिए कोई विकल्प नहीं दिखा ई देता । हिंदू क्रोधित हैं, क्योंकि बुद्धिजीवी वर्ग ने उनकी हिंदू पहचान को उनके लिए शर्म का विषय बना दिया है।
हिंदूत्व पर सतत जोर देने से मुस्लि म खुद को असुरक्षित महसूस कर रहे हैं। दलित और ओबीसी गुस्से में हैं, क्योंकि वे भाजपा के उच्चवर्गीय पूर्वग्रह के कारण अपमानित और बहिष्कृत महसूस कर रहे हैं। मध्यवर्ग क्रोधित हैं, क्योंकि भारत की आर्थिक नीतियों ने हमारे देश को पूर्वी और दक्षिण-पूर्वी एशिया के देशों से बहुत पीछे कर दिया है। इन सारी वा स्तविकताओं के भारत के साथ आम आदमी की नाराजगी है कि अंग्रेजी बोलने वाले श्रेष्ठि वर्ग ने 'आधुनिकता के श्रेष्ठतम फल' हथिया लिए हैं। वंचित नाराज हैं कि मोदी ने रोजगार और अच्छे दिन के वादे पूरे नहीं किए। इन सारे लोगों के गुस्से को पहचान पर जोर देने का तैयार औजार मिल गया- गुजरात में पाटीदार, हरियाणा में जाट, राजस्थान में गुर्जर, आंध्र में कापुस और असम में अहोम आंदोलन इसी के लक्षण हैं।
गुस्से में आमतौर पर कि सी प्रकार का बदला लेने की इच्छा अंतर्निहित होती है, यह इच्छा कि गलत करने वा ले को तकलीफ पहुंचनी चाहिए। बेशक यह तर्क हीन है, क्योंकि गलत करने वा ले के कष्ट भुगतने से शिकार हुए व्यक्ति की तकलीफ खत्म नहीं हो सकती या जो हुआ उसे उलटा नहीं जा सकता। गुस्से का जवाब यह है कि या तो इस पर तब तक हंसा जाए जब तक कि यह चला नहीं जाता अथवा कोई करुणामय उम्मीद जगाने वाला नेता खोज लिया जाए जैसे महात्मा गांधी, मार्टिन लूथर किंग या नेल्सन मंडेला, जो लोगों को क्षमाशीलता का महत्व समझाए। क्रोध का विरोध करना न सिर्फ हमारी मानवीयता बल्कि विवेक को भी रेखांकित करता है। भारत जैसे महात्वाकांक्षी देश में तो यह और भी जरूरी है। राजनीतिक गुस्से का एकमात्र फायदा यह है कि यह हमें बाहर निकलकर वोट देने को बाध्य करता है।
फिर क्रोध की राजनीति की सही प्रतिक्रिया क्या हो? महाभारत में युधिष्ठिर का जवाब था क्षमा और सहिष्णुता । उन्होंने दुर्योधन को जुए में चालबाजी के जरिये उनका राज्य छीनने के लिए क्षमा कर दिया। द्रौपदी चाहती थी कि वे सेना खड़ी करके बदला लेकर राज्य वापस छीन लें पर उन्होंने जवाब दिया कि जुए में हारने के बाद उन्होंने निर्वासन में जाने का वादा किया है। इसी तरह युद्ध के बाद उन्होंने धृतराष्ट्र को भी माफ कर दिया और उन्हें सिंहासन पर बैठाकर उनके नाम पर शासन करने का प्रस्ताव रखा । विद्वानों का मानना है कि चूंकि महाभारत 500 वर्षों में विकसित हुआ है तो युधिष्ठिर का पात्र बौद्ध सम्राट अशोक के अहिंसा के आदर्शों से प्रभावित रहा है, जिनके धर्मस्तंभ 'सभी नस्लों के लिए सम्मान' का संदेश देते हैं। लेकिन भीष्म ने युधिष्ठिर को कहा कि शासक का काम क्षमा करना नहीं बल्कि न्याय देना है।
भारत में सारी सरकारें धार्मिक व जातिगत पहचानों को पुचकारने के कारण समूह के ऊपर व्यक्ति की प्रमुखता पर जोर देने में विफल रही हैं। धर्म दुधारी तलवार है। जहां यह हमारी भ्रमित, अनिश्चित निजी ज़िंदगियों को अर्थ प्रदान करता है वहीं यह एक विशिष्ट पहचान भी निर्मित करता है और यह जल्दी ही सार्वजनिक रूप से खुद को व्यक्त करने लगती है। प्रतिस्पर्धात्मक लोकतंत्र में धर्मनिरपेक्ष राजनीति अपने आप सामने नहीं आती। पश्चिम में राजनेता ओं को राजनीति से धर्म को पूरी तरह हटा ने के लिए प्रेरित करने में सदियां लग गईं। इस्लामी जगत अब भी इस समस्या से संघर्ष कर रहा है। भारत में सहिष्णुता की परम्परा रही है, जिसे महात्मा गांधी ने फिर जागृत किया । मोदी लोगों को याद दिलाएं कि साधारण भारतीय देश को हिंदू पाकिस्तान नहीं बनाना चाहते।
समस्या तब शुरू होती है, जब धर्म राजनीतिक क्षेत्र में प्रवेश करता है। किसी धर्म में विश्वास करने वाला तो स्वाभाविक रूप से यही मानेगा कि उसकी पद्धति श्रेष्ठतम है। धार्मि क विश्वासों से दूर रहने वाले धर्मनिरपेक्षवादियों को भी धार्मि क नागरिकों के दृढ़ विश्वासों को महत्व देना चाहिए और भारतीय राजनीति को मुस्लिमों के लिए हिंदू घृणा के लेंस से देखना बंद करना चाहि ए। हिंदुओं को नीचा दिखा कर वे उनके रोष को मजबूती देकर उन्हें हिंदुत्व में और गहरे धकेल देते हैं। सबसे बढ़कर तो यह है कि हर किसी को यह मानना छोड़ देना चाहिए कि उनकी जीवनशैली ही श्रेष्ठतम है।
मोदी को साम्प्रदायिक हिंसा जरा भी बर्दाश्त न करते हुए अपना पूरा ध्यान जॉब पैदा करने पर लगाना चाहिए। अर्थव्यवस्था में जान आते ही इस्लामी और हिंदू दोनों तरह के धार्मिक कट्टरपंथी अपने जॉब में डूब जाएंगे, अपने बच्चों को अच्छे स्कूलों में भेजेंगे और सामान्य मध्यवर्गीय जीवन जीने लगेंगे। चूंकि युद्ध की बजाय शांति का आकर्षण अधिक होता है, व्यापार-व्यवसाय उपलब्धियों की राह के रूप में धार्मिक श्रेष्ठता व विजयों की जगह ले लेगा।